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Using panul d~ta lix 'I'hc Ncthcrlands, wc lind that wculth holdings uf thc cldcrly
arc vcry uncvcnly distribuled. I~urthcrmurc, thc incyuality incrcascs with agc, which
indicatcs dillcrcnt ratcs of accumulation (or dccumulation) across wcalth levcls. 'I'his
divcrgcnce in tx:havior dcpcnding on wcalth holdings Ix,ints lo a slrong bcyucst motivc.
'I'hc prescncc uf a bcyucst motivc is confirmcd by sufljcctivc inlormation obtained from a
ncw and uniyuc panel, the VSB-pancl, that we exploit. Por most elderly thc Icvcl of assets
is ui luw that it probably mainly scrvcs to satisly a precautionary mulivo, Subjectivc
inl'ormation in lhc Vti13-pancl shows that procautionary motivcs arc ind~rd yuitc strong
among lhc cldcrly. I~ur thc vast m~jority of thc cldcrly social six:urity and pcnsions are
absolutely esscntial to maintain a dcccnt standard of living.
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1. Introductiun
'fherc is considerable inicrest in the wvings tx;havior and wealth holdings of the
cldcrly, fiir obviuus rcusons. First ul' all, thc incrcasing percentage of eldcrly in developed
cconomics makcs thc,r wcalth Ixsiticin of particular intcrext t~om a policy perspective. If
thc clderly havc not saved enough (cithcr Ihrough atiu;t accumulation or pensions) to
sustain thcrosclvcs in old ugc, this may havc dramatic conu~yucnccs for sa;icty as a whole.
A second reasun to be interested in the savings behavior of the clderly is that it provides a
prim., I'acic tc,t uf the life cyclc hypothesis.
In thix paper we uu~ Uutch data to shed lighl un thase. issucs. Our tindings are the
fi,lluwing: Wcalth is vcry uncvcnly distributcd amung cldcrly housc;holds and decumulati-
on of wcalth Jucs not takc placc until a vcry old ago. 'I'hcx: two lacts arc intcrrclated. For
most hou.tic;holds asu~t holdings are so smnll thai thcy cuuld only tinancc cunsumption for
a fcw months. I Icnce, thcse atiuts probably scrve murc as a but7cr for advcrsc shcx;ks lhan
as a source of consumption. Consumplion is mainly linanuud through scxial sccurity and
pcnsiun incumc. I~or thc group of houu:holds with considcrablc asu~t holdings wc find that
thc houx; is a vcry impctttunt componcnt. Ilcrc wc alu, lind littlc cvidcnce tix decumulati-
on. 'I'hcsc obscrvations suggcsl an imlx,rtant Ix;yucst mutivc liir thc wcalthicr huuseholds.
'I'hc importancc of a lx;yucst mutivc is furthcr invcstigatcd on thc basis of subjecti-
vc data tiom a ncw and uniyuc data xt wc arc using. It appean that particularly among
thc rich, peoplc rcport tx;quest motives as a rcason to savc money, evcn at advanced age.
Also, we find that particularly among the elderly precautionary motives play a role; this
motivc gains importancc if wealth holdings arc lowcr.
The organiration of' this paper is as fiillows. In section 2 we provide uime institu-
tional bae:kground atrout the Ncthcrlands necdcd to undentand the empirical analysis.
'I'hcrc wc alsu providc a description of thc data uscd in this study. In scction 3 wc look at
the wealth accumulation of houu:holds in more dctail. Although wc ux~ pancl data
throughout, wc usc thc data in thrcc dil'fcrcnl ways. I~irst wc only considcr a cross scction
to illustratc thc level and distribution of' wcalth holdings. Next we construct synthetic
cohorts to diu:ntanglc agc and cohort eftècts. Finally wc cxploil thc pancl naturc of thc
data, to eliminale possible biases duc to dit~fcrential attrilion of ditTeront wcallh groups. In
section 4 we consider savings on the basis uf lhe VSL3-panel. T'he variable used is self
z
rcported savings. Ilerc we find that next tu thc "usual" variables, also psychological
variables likc patiencc and a self relwrtcd á:quest motivc affèct the Icvcl of savings.
Scctiun 5 cuncludes.
2. Somc BackKround Informatinn
2.1 In.rtitutional details
Thc Ncthcrlands is a country with a high saving ratc. Por instancc, during thc
cightirs huuschuld savings havc amountcd to approximately 14 percent of disposable
incumc. Must uf this saving (approximatcly I1 pcrccnt uf disposablc incomc) is in the
timn uf su-callcd "contractual saving", i.c. pcnsion ILnds, lifc insuranccs, ctc. Other or
"frec" saving amuunts tu approximately 3 tx;rcent of disposable income. I{veryone in the
Ncthcrlands is covcred by a gcncral uW agc pcnsion (AOW) starting at thc agc of 65. For
lhc most part, thc levcl uf bcnc(its is indcpcndcnt of othcr incumc bul ducs dcpcnd on
houschold composition. I~or a couplc lhc Icvcl ol' bcnclits is cyual lo lhc minimum wage
(approximatcly I)11. (l)utch (;uilders) I8,000 per annum after tax), while a single-person
huuschold reccivcs 70 pcrccnt of thc minimum wagc. In addition, thc vasl m~jority of
employecs (RO percedtj is covered by an uccupational pension sc;hemc. in gcneral, if the
empluycr offers a pcnsion schemc, participation in such a sc;heme is compulsory. In
1'~n.~incnkuur! vun Ncderlund (1987) (Pcnsion Map of lhc Ncthcrlands or PN (1987)) it is
estimated that 9c).4 percent of thc pension schcmes is of the defined bcnetit typc, whereas
thc remaining 0.6 pe;rccnt is of thc dclined contribution type. More than 72 pc:rcent of the
pension benelits are defined on lhe basis of final pay. While the pension schemes are
fundcd, the social securiry system is pay-as-you-go. Cumbining the e(7ècts of the general
old age pension and the private (cmployer provided) pension brings the tiillowing before
tax rcplacement rates: approximatcly 19 percent reccivc at lcast RO percent of linal pay, 20
pcrccnt reccivc Ix;twecn 70 and 79 pcrccnt of linal pay, 27 percent receivc bctwccn 60 and
69 pcrccnt anJ 34 pcrccnt rcccivc Icss than 60 lxrccnt.' Note, howcvcr, that thc allcr tax
replacement ralc tcnds to bc higher than thc be;lore tax ona hor examplc, Kcescn (1990)
shows that if the before tax replacement rate is 70 percent, the after tax replacement rate
~ s~e rN t i~~s~)
-~
Mccumc as high as 90 pcrcent. I his phenomenon can tx explained by the progressivity of
thr tax systcm and thc I'act that rctircd pcrsons do not pay utLial sccurity promia.
In additiun to thc general old age Ixxnsion and thc occupational pension schemes,
twu uthcr intititutions nccd tu bc cunsidcrcd: thc disuhility u~hcmc and thc various early
rctircmcnt schcmcs. Approximatcly SOQ,01111 wurkcrs in thc Nethcrlands rcccivc disability
hcnclits. Sumc xtudicx havc indicatrtl that lix many pcuplc thc dísability u;hcmc is cffec-
tiv~ly a comhination ul' uncmploymcnt insurancc und carly rctircmcnt.
2.2 Ucscription of thc data scts
In this paper, we examinc saving and wcalth by using micro data f~om two Dutch
duta scts: lhc Socio-I~.cunomic Pancl (Slil') and lhc VSI3-pancl'. "1'hc SI?P is a survcy
administered hy lhe ('entral Ruroau of titutistics (CBti) li~r a panel of approximately 5,000
hou.u-holds. 'I'hc ti1:P is rcprescntativc of thc I)utch population, cxcluding those living in
slxcial institulions such as nuning humcs. I'hc lirst wrvcy was conductcd in April 1984.
"I'hc samc houscholds wcrc intcrvicwcd in Octohcr 1984 and thcn lwice a ycur (in April
and October) until 19R9. Sincc 1990 lhc survcy has hecn conducted oncc a ycar in May. In
thc Octobcr inlcrvicw, inti~rmation is collcctcd on uicio-cconomic charactcristics, income,
and lahor markct participation. "I hc April intcrvicws contain infiirmatiun ahcwt socio-
ecunomic charactcristics as in thc Octuhcr intcrvicw, hut rathcr than gathcring data alxtut
inwmc, I'rom 19R7 onwards thc April yucstiunnaire includcs yucslions un a widc rangc of
atiu~ts und liabilitics. I:or lhc purrxisc of this pupcr, wc cxaminc data from Ir)R7 to 1991.
'I'hc VSI3-pancl has lxcn dcvised by rescarchcrs at thc Ccntl?R lur I;conomic
Rcu~arch at 'I'ilburg Univenity and has hccn supportcd by thc VSB tiwndation. 'I'he
samplc consists uf a pancl of approximatcly 3,000 huuscholds and is dividcd into two
parts. One part, which is composed ol' approximately 2,000 households is rcpresentativc of
the I)utch population, whcn~as thc ucond part of I,000 hou.x:holds oversampled the rich
households'. 'I'he yuestionnairc is divided into five main parts and information is collected
on thc lollowing: "Ilcalth and incomc", "Accommodatiun and Mortgagcs", "Ilouu.hold and
work", "Assets" and "liconomic Psychology". In this paper, we use the information
Z Por a detaileJ description oF thc SI?I', s~~c: Alessic, Lusardi, and nldershof (1994).
' Only houscholds with incomc grwlcr than IOS,000 guildcrs arc considcrcd in this part.
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c,mt,~jncd jn thc t:conomic Psychology part.
3. Wcalth IluldinKs of the Eldcrly
3.1 Wcalth holdinRs frcrm cross-scctions
Wc reslrict uur attcntion to htiuuhulds whosc hcad is at Icast 50 ycar old.' Givcn
thc importancc and covcragc of thr social sccurity systcm, it js im}xxtant to consider first
not only liyuid and tolal nct wurth`, but alsu social u:curity and pcnsion wcalth." Social
x;curity .md pcnsion wcalth arc lhc actuarially discountcd sums uf' currcnt und I'uture social
sccurjty and pcnsjon incomc that ht,uscholJs rcceivc uftcr agc 65. In tablc I wc presunt thc
djstrihutjon of atl thcsc wcallh mcasures liir dil"fcrcnt agc groups in 1989. "fhc tirst thing
to notc is that thcrc is substantial hctcrogcncity in thc holdings of liyuid and total net
worth in thcsc agc gruups. Standard dcvjatiuns arc big and the mcan of both liyuid and
total nct worth is wcll ahovc the tncdjan, indicatjng that the distrihulion is tikewed to the
righl. Mcan linancjal wcalth is highcr titt thc old cldcrly (abovc 70) than thc younger
houscholds, whilc thc mcdian is lowcr. 'I'his indicates that wcalth incyuality is greatcr
among old huuscholdti than youngcr oncs. Simjlar rosulls apply fiir tutal nct worth, since
wc can see that lhc mcan decrcascs at a lowcr rate than thc mcdjan. Sincc tht: mean and
tncdian of thc distrihutions givc such dil'Ièrcnt jnformalion wc will presenl lhcm both in
most of the analyscs that I'ollow.
"fABLE I AHOU'1' HI?Rl;
' F'rom 199(l on, die tiliP does not cullcd intiimtalion on thc assets aid liabilitics of dic sclf-cmploycd.
In order lo have comparahle ligurex acruss years, we have also excludeJ the self-employeJ from uur samples.
' Wc will usc lhc tcrms liyuid ncl wonh and tinancial nct worth inlcrchangcably, a. rcl'crring to tulal
assets minus dchl, excluding housing. ("I'utal) Net worth is detined as the sum of financial nct worth and net
eyuity.
" Pension and social securily weallh arc not direclly ohscrved in the Si:P. Ilowcvcr, information is
collccted on IaMtt markct history, marilal stalus, family composition and othcr important làctors that allow us
to impute lhese mcasures from the SI:P. See Alessic, Kapteyn anJ Klijn (1994) for a dclailcd description of
the calculation n( pension and social security wcalth and the assumptions necded to perform those cal-
culations. Note, however, that in order to pcrform these calculalions, we need to excludc the households for
which lhe inl'omtaliun necctimry to calculate pension and sexial s~~curiry wealth is not available. 'lherefore,
the sample we used lo construct table I ix restnctcd to a rclativcly smaller numbcr of ohscrvations than in
uther samples, i.e., I Ití? ohservations.
Without presenting a tab!c wc mcntiun that thcrc is also a group ol' houscholds
hrl„c~ thc mcdian that approach rctircmcnt with negativc or littlc wcalth, as littlc as Dtl.
I,It(111. I his t;n~up is disproportionatcly represcntcd, in particular in thc agc group 50 to 64,
hy singlcs, in particular singlc wumcn, anJ hy houscholds with low cducation. Wc tbund
thal Icss than I p~:rccnt uf thc huuscholJs with a hcad who is al Icast 65 ycars old has
nct;ativc ncl wnrlh. 'I his pcrccnlapr is much hiphcr fiir lhc youngcr agc groups.
"I hu impurlancc uf housing in lhc cumposilion uf wca!th is apparcnl by comparing
mcdian liyuid and total nct worth. I lousing is a very important wealth component for the
houtichulcls with a hcad youngcr than 65. I~or this agc gruup mcdiun nct worth is much
highcr thun m~dian linancial wcalth, in particular lix thc agc group 50-54. Iluwcvcr, this
diflèrcncc is much reduccd aftcr a~c 70, huusing ducs nol play a majur role in the
portfiiliu of nun-wca!lhy cldcrly huuscholds. Whilc lhc imfxirtancc of housing should nol
tx undcrstatcc!, homcowncrship, particularly among thc cldcrly is much lowcr in thc
Nethcrlands than in thc IIS. tihcincr and Wcil (1992) report, for example, that the
homeownershíp ratcs of the househu!ds oldcr than G4 is upproximatcly 74 perccnt in thc
US, whi!c in our samp!c the homcowncrship ratc for thc samc group of houscho!ds is only
29 perccnt.
Both linancial wcalth and lotal wcalth are suhstantially luwcr than social sccurity
and pension wcalth. !n particular, social sccurily wcallh repreu~nts a critical part uf the
wcalth ho!dings of thc cldcrly. nlthough mcdian pcnsiun wcalth is much xmallcr than
mcdian social sccurity wcalth, it is still a biggcr com~xrocnt in thc portliilio of mcdian
elderly housaholJs than private net worth. Not surprisingly, social sccurity wcalth is the
most cvcnly distrihutcd wcalth mcasurc. In this cau;, mcans and mcdians are similar and
the median is actually ahovc thc mcan (exccpt for thc agc group 75-79). Notc that every
penon older than 65 in thc houschold reccivcs a social security Ixnetit (AOW). While
thcrc is a rclativcly Ilat ratc for sucial sccurity tx~ncfits, which depc:nds main!y on I'amily
composition, thc pension bcnetits clcpends un wages and on work history (uc scction 2).
Conscyucntly, pcnsion wca!th shows a more skewcJ distribution than uicial sccurity
wcalth, even thuugh thc level of skewness is smaller than in casc of nct worth. In our
samplc approximatcly 2S pcrcenl uf thc houu~holds do not havc pcnsion wcalth, but only
social securily wcalth. 'I'hcsc houscholds arc usually thc onca with littlc or no work history
and thcy arc hcavily conccnlratcd among sing!cs and arc mostly women. fcmalc lahor par-
G
hcipation is vcry low in the Netherlands. Also, while marricd women may tx,nefit from the
lungcr work history of their husband, single women are more likely to rely on social
sccur~ly only.
3.2 Wealth profilcs from cohorts
Whilc lablc 1 shows that median net worth declines with agc, we cannot infer tiom
thcsc figures whcther thc elderly arc decumulating wealth, as prcdictcd by a(simple)
versiun of thc life cycle model. I'he figures confound thc age and cohort effects and it
may br highly misleading to look at one cross sectional distribution only. It is possible
that uldcr cuhorts are simply poorcr than youngcr oncs (lor cxamplc bccausc of lower
wagcs and lowcr initíal wcalth) and wc necd tu takc this fact into account.
Given that wc havc tivc ycars ul' wealth data in the Sf:P (1'rom 1987 to 1991), we
can cunsider thc wcalth holdíngs of diflèrent ycar of birth cohorts. P.vcn though this does
nut cxploit cumplctcly thc pancl aspcct of thc data scl, it allows us to account for cohort
cffccts. In tablc 2a wc considcr mcan and median liyuid and total wcallh holdings of
houscholds who arc 50 or older in 1987 (thcreforc born before 1937) and wc consider
households ul' thc samc ycar ol' birth cohorts four ycars later in 1991. We restrict our
attcntion to liyuid and total net wurth, sincc both social sccurity and pcnsion wealth are
outside the choicc set once the hcad (and the partner) are ulder than 65. t:urthermore, thcse
wcalth measures arc annuitii.cd and thereforc not Ixqucathable (aparl f~om wme special
caxs, where widows can continuc recciving thc pensions of thcir husband cven after his
dcuth).
'I'AI3L1: 2a AliOU"I' Illiltl:
I:rom lable 2a, we sce that median and mcan (liyuid) net worth ol' thc group of
houscholds whciu~ hcad was youngcr than 65 in 1987 has risen much fastcr lxxtwccn 1987
and 1991 lhan the cross-section wcalth age protile (sec tablc I) would suggest. For the
older cohorts thcre is not a particularly clcar pattern, and the reported statistics to test
whcthcr medians changc betwccn 1987 and 1991 do not indicate significancc. So we tind
ncithcr cvidcncc of accumulation nor of decumulation.
~
Note that it is still difficult tu currectly interprct the.tie findings. Many problems
nr.~.l ~u be addr~ssed before we may attach any interpretation to the data. Pirst, there may
cxist dil'fcrcmial mortality across huusehoWs. As somc authors have mentiuncd, wealthy
houu~holJs tcnd to livc longer and thc graup uf houuhofds wc obscrve, litr cxample after
agc 7O, may hc disproportionately rcprescntcd by thcsc hou.x~holds.' In this case, we may
bc IrJ lo incurrcctly rcjcct thc prcdictions uf thc li(c cyclc modcl. Similurly, if rich clderly
arc Icss likcly than poor cldcrly tu livc with thcir children or cntcr nursing homes ( in this
ca.u thcy wutdJ drop out I'rom thc sample), older houscholds muy tx: hcavily ulected into
thc high wcalth group."
3.3 Wcalth profiles from pancl data
'IAl~l.l: 2b i11tOUl IIGItI:.
To address thcsc problcros, wc cxploit thc pancl Ièaturc of the data x( and considcr
only the houscholds which are in thc data sct both in 1987 and in 19914. 'I'able 26 shows
that lor the alder age groups in 1991 mcan and median liyuid net worth and total net
worth tend to be lower in the pancl data set than whcn accounting for cohorts. In contrast
to thc argument in thc prcccding subsection, we sec by cumparing table 2a and table 2b,
that rich houscholds arc morc likcly to drop out of thc sample in thc pancl analysis than
poorer houscholds. '1'his attrition can bc explained by thc fact that non-responscs tend to be
marc likely among the richer hou.u~holds, who hold a morc diversified portt2)lio and have
to lill in many yucstions on their assets and liabilitics.n' The use of pancl data is of
critical impurtance for this analysis. "I'able 2b shows that mean liquid net worth increases
' ticc I lurd ( 19R9, 1990) anJ Atlanasio and I luyncs (1995).
' tice alsu Borsch-Supan (1992).
" If Ihc hcad uf a houschold changcs during the live year period, it is still treated as bclonging to the
same eohort it bclonged to in 1987. As a result o( this cunvemion, some of Ihe changes observed may be the
result of househuld compositiun changes.
"' 1-or an analysis ol'the data sclectiun and the evaluation ul' non-responu ratcs, sec Alcssic, Lusardi and
Aldersho( (1994) and Alessic and 'l.andvliet (1993). f?ven though thc attrition may leave us with a selective
sample, if the simple life cycle mcxlel hulds, we shuuld ubserve decumulation as the head of the household
gets ulder.
s
rathcr than dccrcases as the houscholds agc. Median liyuid nct worth rcmains roughly
acn,tant for the older cohorts (except for thc 70-74 and 80t cohorts, where there is a
tcnclrncy fi~r thc mcdian to dccrcasc). Por thc cohorts in thc age group 70-74 and 75-79 in
19R7, thc abwlutc incrcasc in mcan total nct worth is smallcr than thc incrcasc in liyuid
ncl worth, which implics that mcan huusing cyuity dccrcases over time. Indced, we do
ohticr~c a dccrcasc in homc owncrship, which pocs 1'rom tu 2G.R pcrccnt to 23.5 and from
31).~) to 23.R fur thc two groups respcctivcly. Vcnti und Wiu~ (1989 and 1990) also show
that in thc l)ti, the decrease in homcownenhip happens very latc in the life cycle, but the
decrcase in humcownership appcan to tx: much lower than in thc Netherlands. Median net
worth of thc 70-74 cohort dccrcascs by 18 pcrccnt during thc 4 ycar pcriod, whilc median
liyuid nct wurth only .lccrcascs by 4 pcrcent. Also, contrary to tablc 2a in which lhc pancl
featurc of thc SI{P dalau;l is nut cxploitcd, tablc 2h xccros to indicatc that the mcdian
houschold in thc 70-74 cuhort decumulated wcalth mainly by reducing thcir home eyuity.
Finally wc noticc that thc mcdian of changcs in linancial or total wcalth do not
always show lhc same direction as thc change in thc median of the distributions of
financial and total wcalth. l~or instancc, for thc 70-74 cohort thc mcdian linancial wealth is
Dfl. 9500 in 19t37 and f)fl. 9092 in 1991, yet thc mcdian change in tinancial wealth
shows an inrreu.ce of I)tl. 429.
'I'o undcrstand what haplxns to thc wcalth holdings of cldcrly houu:holds it is
obviously impurtant to pay attention to the evolution of their incomes. Our data show that
mean and median pension incomc remain fairly constant ovcr time, except after age 80
whcrc mcdian pcnsion incomc dccrcaus somcwhat from D(1. 17 ~)64 to I)Il. 15,34R.
Ilowcvcr, mediun income pcr cyuivalcnt adult" rcmains fairly constant liir this group,
which implics thal the drop in pcnsiun inwmc is mainly duc to thc fact lhat in somc
houscholds onc of thc spouscs dicd bctween 1987 and 1991.
3.4 Wealth profiles and family composition
So far, wc havc not accountcd for family sii.c in making our comparisons across
tima "I'hcrc is some theoretical work which cxplains why saving is intimately related to
('amily composition. l3rowning (1994), I'or example, emphasizes that thc household is
" The CI3S cyuivalence scalc used ix almost thc wme as thc equivalence scale used in the AOW and
most occupatiunal pcnsion schcmcs.
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cumruscd uf individuals who may havc diflcrcnt prupcnsitics to savc. I'or inslancc, it is
wcll ~nown that on averabe men marry younger women and that the life expectancy of
wumcn is highcr than of mcn. Women may have an inccntive to save more. Since we
classil'y thc h~wschotd by using thc ugc uf lhc hcad uf thc houu;hold, wc may be dis-
rcgarding this rlicct.
Without prcxnting any tablcs wc hrictly dcscrifx haw wcallh holdings of single
and multi pcrsun houuholds cvulvc uvcr timc. Buth linancial wcalth and nct worth is
much lowcr liir thc singlc tx:rson huuu~hold. I lomcuwncnhip, in parlicutar, is vcry low for
thc (~~-74 cnhcvt: it is 14 pcrccnt in 19R7 and it gocs tu I 1 pcrccnt in 1991. Mcan housing
cyuity dccrcaus by UII. 7,770, ~,oing from I)Il. 24,350 to I)tl. 16,659 in 1991. Givcn lhc
fact that housing priccs incrcascd considcrahly tx;twccn 19R7 and 1991, this change in
houtiing cyuity is potcntially cxplaincd by thosc: singlc pcrscm houu:holds who sold the
housc. Ilowcvcr, thc cldcrly mcdian singlc housc:hold is typically not a homc owncr, and
conscyucntly mcdian financial wcalth and mcdian nct worth arc almost cyual. Purthcrmorc
txith incomc and thc mcdian wcalth to incomc ratio arc rathcr low lor this group of housc-
holds. 'fhc lattcr has a mcdian cyual to 0.30. Por multí-pcrson houscholds thc median
financial wcalth to incomc ratio is atxiut twicc as high. I?vcn this is uf couru~ not tcrribly
high, as it would imply roughly thal lix thc mcdiun huuschuld liyuid wculth could linancc
consumption lix not much morc than R months. ~I~hcrctiirc, thc lact that thc mcdian
houschold docs not dccrcau~ hislhcr small amount ul' wcalth, cannot casily t~c intcrprcted
as evidence against the life cyclc mcxtcl. It secros rcasonablc to assume thal thc rcmaining
wcalth scrvcs as a butlèr against futurc contingcncies.
3.5 Wealth prafïles and homc ownership status
~'AHLt:S 3a ANU 36 ABOU'I' HI:RI:
(iiven thc fact that in thc Netherlands only a small fraction of thc clderly
houscholds own a house, it is interesting to look se:parately at the wcalth protiles of the
majority of thc Dutch elderly houscholds, namcly thc rcntcrs. In the panel we condition on
whether houscholds were renters or homc owners in 19R7. The first thing that stands out
fo
t~um tablc 3a is the low levcl of mcan and median net worth of renters.''- " I'he median
wc.lith to income ratio is wcll tx~low onc, given that median total income of households
~tldcr than 65 is appmximately Dfl. 20,000. f3y looking at the mcdian changc in net worth
in tablc 3a, wc note that up to thc 70-74 cohort, at Ieast 50 percent of thc households do
nut dissavc. On thc othcr hand, thc umuunt ol' savings is vcry small. Por thc oldcst cohort,
thc mcdian changc in nct worth is only slightly ncgalivc. As bcliirc, this amount of wcalth
w~~uld last a houxhold only a rclativcly short pcriod. It uxms rcasonablc tu assume that
litr most houscholdti thc rcmaining wcalth mainly scrvcs as a buflcr ag~linst advcrsc
circumstanccs, in othcr words thc moncy is hcld for prccautionary rcasons. Wc rcturn to
this issuc in thc ncxt xctiun.
In tahlc 36, wc summarirc thc wcufth agc rolationship of thosc cfdcrly hou.uholds
whu wcre humc uwner in 1987. I~ur this group of houu;holds, thc housing cyuity is the
dominating asset in their portfi~lio. I~or example, in 1987 median tinancial wealth among
thc home owncrs in the 65-74 cohort was I)Il. 25,U00, whilc median housing equity was
about 5 timcs that amount, numcly DII. 130,000. Althuugh tinancial atixas play a rclative
mínor role in thc portfolio of cldcrly homc uwners, thcy hold morc liyuid wealth than
renters. k3oth mean net worth anJ mcan financial wealth increased betwcen 1987 and 1991
for all cohorts older than 50. Ilowcvcr, mcdian net worth and mcdian housing eyuity
among humc uwncrs in the 65-74 and 75 pfus cohorts Jccrcascd in that pcriod. "1'ablc 36
shows that a purt uf this dccrc~u: nmy Ix altributcd to thc fact that somc cldcrly house-
holds who wcrc owncr in 1987, havc xild thc housc. Using Amcrican data Shciner and
Weil (1992) also lind that elderly home owncrs reducc their housing cyuily as thcy age
and that thc rcduction in housing cyuity is relatcd to twa important cvcnts in lifc:
widowhood and death. ' I'hey find thal lhc reductíon in housing equity lhat cx;curs at the
time of widowhoud partly explains the age protile ol' housing wealth tiwnd in the data.
Wc havc investigated for 3 dil'ferent ycars ol' birth cohorts (55-65, GS-74 and 75 f)
and li~r 1'our groups (singlc or multi pcrwn houschold in 1987 and 1991) 1hc ownership
rates in 1987 and 1991, and the transition rates from owning to renting and vicc versa. Not
surprisingly, thc clderly renten almost ncvcr buy a house in their old age. Only the
'~ Note thal, even for renlers, lhcre rcmains a dil7crence txxlwecn tinencial wcalth and nel worth. 'Ibe
reason for this (small) diftèrence is Juc to other rcal cstate (and associated mongages) that households can
own (sce also tahlc 2).
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lransrtion J~rom owning to rentinb is of importancc to understand the decline in home
~~c. ~~c~rship ratc which touk placc hctwcen 1987 and 1991. Wc have tried to rclate transi-
tiuns lrom uwncrship to rcnting to changes in I'amily composition (including death of a
spousc) and to agc. Although wc sccm ti~ scc a pattcrn wherc oldcr cohorts may have a
highcr tcndcncy to movc to a rcnlccl dwclling, thc small numbcr of obscrvations has made
it impossiblc lu suy anything dclinitivc about what thc main lactors arc tx:hind thcse
transitions.
It is useful to xum up what wc have ohscrvcd so làr. "I'here is little indication of
suhstantial dccumulatiun. Mcans su;cm to grow a bit lastcr (or fall a bit Icss fast) than
mcdians. "fhis hints al an incrca.u in incyuality among thc cldcrly with agc. Onc cxplana-
tiun litt this would be a tx~yucst motivc as modcllcd My Iturd (1989), whcrc thc cxtcnt of
dccumulation will bc invcrsely rclatcd to nct worth. I~urthcrmore, li~r most households net
wurth is so low that it can hardly bc uscd li~r incumc smoothing. Rathcr, thc amount of
wcallh lefl wuuld u:em to bc just cnough liir prccautionary reasons. 'fo invcstigute thc two
explanations (hcyucst motivc and procautionary motivc) givcn for thc obu;rvcd patterns of
wcalth holdings among the clderly, wc now turn to a new source of evidence, the VSB-
pancl.
4. Savings
4.1 Household savinKs in thc VtiB-panel
As wc mentior.ed previously, the VSB-panel is composed of lwo parts: a data set
representative uf the Dutch population, and a sub-sample where rich houscholds are
oversampled. We will usc both samples in the analysis of the importancc of bequest and
precautionary motives. Wc have to say, howcver, that duc to non-response rates for some
qucstions and thc proccss ol' cditing and clcaning ol' thc data, thc final rcprcuntative
samplc docs not yuitc rcflcct thc lxrpulatiun uf Dutch huuscholds. In particular, housc;holds
with low incomcs seem to be underreprcusnted.
We ux; the intiirmatiun aboul saving, which is cmbodied in the economic psycho-
logical part of the VSB yuestionnaire. In this part, houscholds are asked to report whether
lhey havc saved in the past 12 months and we can thereforc examine in this dafa whether
the clderly dissave. Consistent with thc prcvious tigures from thc Sf;P data, many
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h,m,~~hulds 6l1 nr oldcr have indicatcd that lhey continue to have positivc saving. The
an ~unt savcd, which in the psychulogical part of thc VSB data is obscrvcd in brackets
ral)uur than .a a continuous variablc, indicatcs that lirr thc large majority of the elderly
hnu,chulds ( i.c. houscholds with a hcad ( restxmdcnt) 60 or oldcr), who continue to have
puxitivc savings, thc amount ~avcJ is cithcr Icss than I)Il. 3,U00 or bctwccn I)Il. 3,000 and
UII. III,000. Savings arc not cunccnlratcd in thc sub-samplc uf rich houscholds. Whilc a
hi~hcr propurtion ol' houschoWs in this group lhan in thc rcprescntativc sample have
indicatcd that thcy savcd ín thc past 12 munths, in thc luttcr ktmplc as wcll morc than 50
pcrccnt uf thc samplc of thc cldcrly houscholds havc indicatcd thcy savcd. npart t~om
suving in thc past, huuscholds arc askcd whcthcr Ihcy plan to savc in thc ILturc. "fhis
qucstion alluws us to cxaminc whcthcr savings tcnd tu pcrsist among thc cldcrly. "1'he
cvidcncc indicalcs that not only many cldcrly houu~holds rcixrrtcd to havc savcd in thc
past 12 months, but th.;y also plan to continuc wvinp in thc luturc.
1'hc yucslionnairc has yuitc a fcw yucsliom ;,txrul motivcs to krvc". 'I'hc two
musl importanl oncs among thc cldcrly arc Ihc motivc to havc uimc savings to cover
unfora;.tiecn expcnscs as a con.u:yucnce of illncss or uccidents ( we will call this the
precautionary motivc) and a lx~yucst motivc. I'or must motives respondents could indicate
on 7-txrint scalc ( I'rom "vcry unimportanl" tu "vcry important") whcthcr a particular motive
was considereJ important. I~or the cldcrly ( houst:hold hcad 60 or older) the mcan score for
thc prccautionury motivc Wa8 l:yIIAI I(1 5.09. In lhe lighl of the discussion rcgarding tables
3u and 3b, il is of interest to comparc mcsm scores lix this variablc tiir rcnters and home
owncrs. We lind a mcan score cyual to 5.28 tirr renters and a mean score cyual to 4.95 for
home owners. ' I'he differencc is significant at the 1Q ~~o Icvel (t-1.85). ~'his is consistent
with thc suggcstion that a prccautionary motivc is particulary relcvant lix houscholds with
low wcalth. As we havc secn, weulth of renters is substantially lower th:ni that of home
owncrs.
Regarding tx~qucsts, two important facts cmcrgc I~rum the data. nppruximately one
third of thc rcpr~centativc samplc and half of thc rich houscholds sub-wmplc havc
indicated that lhcy have thoughl aboul Icaving a Ixyucst. ' fhe perccnwges arc higher
among the cldcrly. Whilc thinking about a bcyuest does not ncccssarily imply Icaving one,
" 13 motivcs ure lisled and they raoge frum children's cJuu,tion, lu buy a hou~c or durables, to
prcwutionary motivcs and aJdilionally thcrc is a lot of informauion about Ixquusts.
l~
il i. inli~rmation at leatit indicatcs thal hcyucsts are prescnt in the minds of Uutch house-
h~~IJx. 'I'he othcr rclevant fact is that whcn asked about thc amount of the bcyuests, a very
larec proportiun uf huuscholds, txrih in thc representative and the sub-sample of the rich,
havc indicatcd large amounts fix thc bcyuests. Por thc huuscholds in thc representative
s:u„plc, who havc indicatcd thcy havc thought alxwt Icaving a beyucst, thc mcdian amount
is I)Il. I50,000 while the mcan is I)Il. 223,551. In the sub-samplc of rich households the
valucx arc UII. 350,000 and DII. 477,098 respectivcly. For thc households whose head is
60 ur oldcr, a biggcr proportion havc indicatcd thc tx~yucst motivc and thc median and
mcan arc UII. I i)O,ODU and 267,fi07 fbr thc rcpreu;ntativc samplc and DII. 500,000 and
UII. 528,538 liir thc rich households. "1'he amount of thc beyuest is relevant per se, but can
bc better undcrstood whcn considcring the asu,ts that houscholds havc indicated they
wuuld like to bcyucath. Muny houscholds havc indicatcd cash, but a big proportion, in
particular in the sub-samplc of thc rich, have indicatcd thc house among the assets to Icave
as a bcyucst. Among thc cldcrly, thcrc is a higher pruportion ot' houscholds who havc in-
dicatcd thc housc as a bc:qucst than in the total samplc.
Anothcr useful fcaturc ol' thc beyucst data is that, among thc recipicnts of the
lxqucsts, thc partncr is indicated as oftcn as thc children. Among the eldcrly, the children
are indicated more f~eyucntly among the recipicnts of the bcyuest. Also, a non-negligible
share of houscholds, in particular in the representative sample, have indicated charities and
such institutions as recipients of thcir txquests.
4.2 iavinRs, housinQ and bequcst
We prescnt hercafter two scts of regressions, where we investigatc whether the
re;portcd motives can explain thc actual tx;havior of thc elderly. In the first u~t of regres-
sions, wc examinc which variahles can explain savings. In the second set of regressions,
we invcstigatc morc clox~ly thc bcyucst motivc.
"fAl~l.li 4 AROll'I' HI;RI.:
We perliirm an ordered probit regression where the dependcnt variablc is ropre-
sented by the amount of saving, rcported in brackcts, that thc household has done in the
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past 12 m~mths. In tahic 4, wc prcu~nt rcxults Ibr thc tatal samplc and fiir thc cldcrly
unly" Wc lind that savings dccrc~u a5 thc respemdcnt" in the household gets older.
l hc huuschuld saves more if thc partner is prcunt and wve more whcn the main respon-
dcnl is a malc ulthough this cflcct i, not significmu in thc cldcrly subsamplc. It also saves
murc if thc rcipondcnt hiilds a univcrsity dcgrcc. "I'hcsc results arc consistcnt with thc
tindings of uthcr cmpiricul tituclics un saving."' I~urlhcrmorc, consistenl with the predic-
tiom uf thc lilè cyclc-pennanent incumc mudcl, savings move in anticipation uf expected
incomc changcx. l"hc survcy rcpurts inliirmalion un Ihc cxpcctcd pcrccntagc changc in
incomc in thc ncxt tivc ycars. 'I'hc rcgressiun coefficicnt corresponding to this variahlc is
negativc and is signilicantly diflcrcnt from icro for thc total samplc, indiwting that some
savings arc Jonc tu smouth futurc cxpcctcd incomc dccrca.~es. While many clderly have
indicatcd that lhcy cxpcct lhcir incumc to rcmain thc ktmc in thc ncxt 5 ycars, somc
eldcrly report lhat thcy expcct thcir incomc to dt,~:rc~~x; in the ILturc. 'I'his is rcasonable, in
particular il' wc consiucr thc loss in annuity incomc which is asscx:iatcd wilh thc potcntial
dcath of onc mcmbcr in thc lamily. I'hc rcgression cocflicicnt correspcmding to thc varia-
blc indicating thc changc in incomc in thc ncxt fivc ycars rcmains ncgativc lor thc old
huuticholds as wcll, although thc signiticancc is wcak. Wc havc alw cunsidcrcd lwo othcr
variablcs which arc providcd in thc data u~t and can bc ol' impcxtancc for savings. One is
thc plunning huriron of thc huuschold and cunsistcnt with intuition, houxcholds with
longcr horirons savc morc. Wc havc uscJ this vuriahlc liir the eldcrly loo. In this casc, thc
planning hurizun can alui indir.itc Ihc rcmaining lifctima Wc lind that Ihc cldcrly with
longcr horiions tcnd to savc morc in thcir old agc. 'I'hc other variablc, callcd 1'aticnt in
tahle 4, is a scll~-reportcd mcasure uf attitude towards spending and saving which can
proxy lor thc degrec uf patiencc andlor thriftiness. Consistent with intuition, thrifty
houscholds anJ thrifty eldcrly tend to savc morc. Wc tind that savings are vcry sensitive to
income. We tind even in the raw Jata that a high prufxirtion of rich elderly roport to have
saved in the past 12 months. 'I'he amounts saved are alw higher than in thc rcpresentative
'" In our estimation prucedure thc clJcrty are dcfincd to tw Ihusc houscholds whose hcad (respondcnt) is
at least GO ycar uld.
" In most r.~ses (2200 out of thc 2300 houscholds) the hcaJ uf thc household is thc respondent, while in
the remaining caxcs thc respondent is the partner.
"' Sec thc rcvicw uf thc evidcnce in Rrowning and I.usardi ( I~)9S).
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samplc of lhc clderly houscholds.
An intcresting Icature of thcsc rcgressinns is that thc houuholds who have thought
ahuut Icaving a bcyucxt savc murc. I'his is thc ca.x for thc total samplc and it holds also
in thc samplc uf thc cldcrly.
'I nlil.l~: S nl3c)U f I II:IZI',
Oivcn thcsc I~ndings, wc invcstigalc in morc dctail thc bcyuest motivc for thc
eldcrly only. Wc usc hcro buth thc infiirmation on whcthcr ur not thc respondent has
thought aboul Icaving a txyucst and thc planncd amount. In tablc 5, wc prescnt the
empirical lindings. Wc estimatc a prubit rcgression lix thc tx;yuest variablc, while we
perfurm a tobit liir thc desired amuunt of thc bequcst. "I'wo impurtant variables emerge
tiom table 5. I~irst incomc is a strong dctcrminant of thc tx:yucst motivc. I'his result is
very rubust and was noticwble cvcn in thc raw dala. 'I'he ucond is homcuwnership. 'I'he
eWerly who own a housc are morc likcly tu rctxirt u tx:yucst mutive. 'fhesc tindings are
consistent with the simple statistics rcportcd tx:forc. Muny houuholds havc indicated the
houu among the asscts to Ilavl ati a bcqucs( and their cxpcctations may cunli~rm to their
actual lx:havior. Nute alMi that bcyucsts arc pusitivcly rclated with age. 'I'his provides
again sume indication why lhc cldcrly do nut dissavc as thcy agc. ns for saving, wc find
that househulJs who havc longcr planning horizuns and arc morc palicnt or thriliy arc also
more likcly tu havc a Ixyucst mutivc. "fhis result is consistent with cxtcndcd lilc cycle
mudcls that tukc bcyucsts intu accuunt.
'fhc only uutcomc which sccros to tx; cuuntcrintuitivc is lhal lhc dummy tiir
childron has a ncgativc cocfficicnt in kxith thc probit and thc tobit. Sincc at thc limc of thc
analysis lhc wcalth data were nut avuilable yct lor analysis, we suspect that thc children
dummy may pick up a negative inllucnce of thc prcu~ncc of children on wcalth accumula-
tion; thc negative sign would thcn indicatc a txisitivc clTecl of wcalth on a twyucst motive,
rathcr than a dircct negative cflccl ol' thc prcu~ncc of children. We should also note that




"I'hc picturc cmcrging from our analysis can hc summarized as lollows. Wcalth
huldings among thc eldcrly arc vcry uncvcnly distributcd. After the agc ol~ sixty-five the
mcdian houschi,ld ducz nut sccm tn accumulatc or dccumulatc signilicant amounts of
wcalth anymura Only at rathcr advanccd agcs do wc scc sumc dccumulation. In itself this
cannot bc takcn as strung cvidcncc against thc lifc cyclc hypolhcsis. Pur must cldcrly, thc
wcallh huldings are so low, that thc rcmaining wcalth can hc sccn ati a buflcr lix advcrsc
shucks. I his i, consistent with lhc linding in lhc VSB-pancl that among various possible
motivcs lo zavc thc cldcrly atWch a grcat dcnl of signilicancc to a prccautionary mutivc.
Ilowcvcr, thcrc is a sccond imlxirtanl mulivc, namcly thc hcqucst motivc. 'I'he lx;qucst
motivc is particidarly prcdominant among the well-tu-do clderly and aptxars lo provide a
signilicunt cxplanation of savings of largc portions of thc clderly.
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Table 1: Weal[h Holdings of the Elderly
p of Liquid net worth tiet worth Social Pension Total
obs securit3' wealth
Age mean median mean mediazt mean median mean median mean media~
50-54 202 30364 15772 100132 56867 169689 178876 122952 88251 392775 360958
(59199) (141204~ (299191 1129190) (207770)
55-59 163 32503 16682 93579 .30233 191930 208753 1I8650 82'98 404160 359343
(55951) (1244021 (38768) 1153793) (223482)
60-64 149 35791 12658 95119 28899 225730 242149 119098 52260 439948 377043
i89108) (1500371 (50939) (168850) (270354)
65~9 245 31469 14415 84I02 24729 228099 24b764 128634 59550 440836 353259
(504101 (12.1028) t51?98) [1767651 (275377)
70-74 206 36950 9812 90633 15154 189172 201126 81518 282?6 361323 283228
(97408) (173668) (47468) (154323) (271842)
75-79 121 41037 9526 64462 10460 142500 124763 61157 15380 268120 207962
(113432) (137844) (42917) (110988) (219298)
80t 76 50181 7973 79620 9605 I00920 85397 37481 12801 218022 140880
(165325) (22I824) (37276) (56343) (254862)
Source: Own calculations based on [he SEP.
Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 2a: Mean and ~fedian ~Financiall Wealth of Ederly Cohorts
p of obs Financial wealth !~et wonh Rattr sum test
Home owner- equalin. median
ship (p-values)
razes
Age year tnean median mean median Fin. Net
in weahh worth
1987
87 91 87 91 87 91 87 91 87 91 87 9l
50-54 279 256 19655 35258 11000 18675 46.9 5 L9 72626 111600 30205 6~330 0.0010 0.0004
1986 3740 1578 1868 ?.99 3.12 6440 9111 5273 l0851
55-59 283 295 24824 39186 11378 17211 40.6 42.0 78435 108730 27883 38131 0.0094 0.0794
2912 5044 1427 1922 2.92 2.87 6807 ]0038 4989 9923
60-64 285 276 33240 50035 15000 20767 s0.3 36.6 94834 111173 33851 37628 0.0038 0 2799
3338 5314 1498 2488 2.91 2.90 8360 9641 9155 8614
65-69 266 256 35325 40153 11887 12276 27.8 26.5 79050 94916 16018 18340 0.6957 0.7703
5335 5618 1283 t407 3.75 2.76 904' 10523 2728 2908
70-74 211 198 25691 32472 9981 9300 29.8 27.3 71424 79705 I4350 14244 0.9553 0.9453
3700 4120 1248 1216 3.15 3.17 9200 10335 3289 3117
75-79 l60 101 43068 38616 13337 11160 24.2 23.7 84787 75445 16900 17577 0.8776 0.9142
9005 7369 2128 2897 3.39 4.23 13879 13293 2347 4157
80f 110 51 24581 35389 6500 9300 13.6 19.6 44535 66582 6500 12374 0.5201 0.3792
4637 8207 1298 3657 3.27 5.56 9365 17919 1447 4411
Soutrx: Own calculations based on the SEP.
Whenever a cell contains two numbers, the second one is the standard enor associated with [he mean or median in the same cell.
Table 2b: Mean and Median (Financial) Wealth o( the Same Elderh Cohorts (Panel Data)
Financul weil~ Home Nn r~orth Chnnge fin. ucaldt change nec M~orth Sten teu equalin-
pw~~ mMian
Pncemecs t p-s ahus ~
.4ae N of inean medun mci~ med~an
m oM
I987
1987 1991 1987 1991 1987 199i 1967 I991 1987 I991 mean m~tfun mean medun fw. net
M'eAIIl1 M'Jfii
SO-SA 189 20798 29395 11900 187a8 50.3 a9.7 80375 101657 35900 60898 8597 3397 '133i 'S15 0.0000 0.0000
2351 '6I6 1735 ~?69 3.64 3.bi 8353 9885 63a5 11984 '356 10'.i ~'S; 1950
5:-cq ?p3 !6'a8 333]' 10600 158I0 A0.9 39.a 77913 95917 23500 '9'7' '073 ]L'0 IS10? 3AW 0.0016 0.0000
3921 5267 1313 '061 3.a5 3.a3 8166 113.'a a771 6I73 '360 713 6PLt lab7
64-63 191 35096 40063 16000 17670 36.6 3i.0 8737a 91090 '8137 '8616 3960 1960 3707 IlJ-t 0.0007 p.0738
4205 4217 194s 2611 3.39 3.40 8888 9073 7970 7616 3.38 880 a059 999
65L9 18a 31348 a0810 11265 11532 26.6 23.9 69720 7935' 16018 17335 9a6? 238 962] 2i8 0 3560 O.a130
5096 7996 t477 1562 3.26 3.13 6783 11490 386i 3129 SOIa 525 c7p0 553
'4'3 IS3 '3416 30933 9500 909: 26.8 '3,t 67368 67832 1'S00 10230 7517 a29 sbi 51 0.'090 0.5000
31G0 5027 1'98 li0a 3.58 3.J3 9511 1003a 3'35 ?293 3936 4al 5'63 197
75 '9 BS ?7950 35738 I2300 13181 30-9 23.8 68329 72601 17750 18348 7786 I3a0 a"' 426 0.0188 0.2900
6539 7203 2628 318t 5.04 a.65 1?531 13548 53aa 3956 360' 898 SOa-i 10?7
80- 36 31033 30aa5 11865 5255 22.2 16.6 68116 59315 13742 10853 -587 -1349 -380I -]362 0.0326 0.0670
8076 7751 3348 4529 6.93 6.20 19831 19221 G682 4635 4480 1707 6026 1869
Soum: Own calculations based on the SEP
Whene~er a cell contains two numbers, the second one is the standard error azsociated with [he mean or median in the same cell.
Table 3a: Mean and Median ( Financial) Wealth of Renters ( Pane! Analysis)
Financial u-eatth Vet uorth ~ fm u.ealth ~ net u~orth Sien cest zqualin~
median ~p-~aluzs)
Age m k of inean mídian mzan median mcan median mzan medien
1987 obs
1987 I99t I987 1991 1987 1991 1987 1991 fm. ne~
wedlill wORll
50-ía 94 11771 l98?Z 6'94 9005 1?963 23660 6294 10837 8061 '4ss 1069ï 2610 0.0298 0.0095
2005 2968 2171 3035 2213 3682 2399 3125 2299 115? 2718 IJ18
55-59 l20 17862 2416-i 5492 7704 18696 31871 549? 7703 6301 774 13175 79~ 0.082s 0.0548
4779 7378 1523 1661 4837 13229 1523 1661 3239 695 8990 671
60ó4 121 22209 24524 I1770 11139 22899 25774 II800 11139 2 315 367 2874 4-t2 0.2753 0.4672
2896 3407 1956 1970 2987 3701 1816 1970 1933 667 2172 706
65-69 13i 19208 21337 8000 9300 20041 22B80 8000 9300 21?9 I L' 2838 9l 0.86?J I.0000
2716 3453 1321 1615 2821 3625 1421 I615 1723 i~6 1951 Sa-i
70-74 ll2 15415 17476 6791 6091 1925~ 19748 6791 6091 2062 200 493 lI5 0.7770 0.9248
2237 3599 1293 1354 3964 3991 1293 1354 3009 430 4623 ~50
75t 86 16389 15868 7750 6968 16389 1657t 7750 7433 -520 -2.30 182 -I33 0.5990 0.7J65
2755 2448 1719 2027 2755 2391 1719 2203 1524 357 1636 519
Source: Ow.n calculations based on SEP.
Whenever a cell concains two numbers. che second one is the standard error associated with the mean or median in the same cell.
Table 36: !~tean and 4ledian (Financiall K-ealth o( O..ners in 1987 ( Panel .4na1~-sisl
Financial Nealth 1et wonh Housing eywc.




1991 198- 199I t987 1991 1987 1991 198' 1991 198' 1991 1987 1991
50-3~1 9: ')S.8 '9'30 ~ 388í8 :91?3 '60': I3"„' I-9231 I'4300 14"s9t II'~3J Illi2'7
ocUt10 IL128
40.ii 3091 3~68 4510 133'0 1~7i1 11688 9]'.9 111I6 la~"3 91'S lii9-0
SSfi-t 133 90.8 J'065 558'7 2~1810 316'1 179133 195í83 130300 I5811? 13?079 I39'US 1175W 1'09U.1
57'6 5673 '3i' 3i0? 10971 II?93 6i89 7?86 7610 8~3J 7141 390-
6~-"~ 90 8i.6 55900 8??39 2~310 203'8 '030~0 2186?8 16'160 IS,s,8 IA"IJO 1~6~"8 131xt00 1'~~s~
10108 162a0 3139 5919 16353 ,1 "~ 16"'- 160U1 11198 111~9 10'93 80~3
7i- 3a 73.~ 60458 8039? ?819~ a8788 19l18' ?00'~' 150366 I13333 1337]8 119865 117500 Iti9?"9
15,33 161?8 9617 19?5' '6117 28U10 ?3248 26'U6 16017 188" I6163 IS-91
Table 3b: ~1tan and Vedian IFinancialt N~ealth o1 O~~ners m 198' (Panel Anahstil
.4ee in
19g-
- obi ~ fmancial ~~ealth ~ Xe[ ~~~orth ] Housine equin~ Sign ezst zqualin
median tp-~alua;i





















































Source: O~cn calculanons baseo on Jtr.
Nltene~er a cell contains t.w numbers. the xcond one is the standard zrror azsociated ~~ith the mean or median in the same cell.
~I ablc 4: I luuschuld tiavings and l3cyucst





















































































!f obs 2278 I500 454 375
Lug Likcl. -3330.76 -2028.G3 -G07.61 -467.84
Standard errors in parcnthcu;s.
Sourcc: VSR pancl.
I'aMc 5: Rcyucsl Mutivc
Pruhit rcgroxziuns I'ohit rc(:ressiuns
Rcprctienlativc Rcprescntalivc Kcprescntativc Rcpresarialivc
Xc rich hh samplc Bc rich hh samplc
('unst,mt - 1.336 -O.RG7 -1059RG4 -894364.3
(O.R70) (0.90R) (3131R8) (324274.5)
Agc 0.(122 0.014 11268.2 8581.6
((1.012) (0.013) (42G3.2) (4422.6)
Malc -0.344 -0.2R5 -259G2.0 -38610.2
((LIR6) ((1.195) (G6349.0) (69257.9)
Parlncr -0.191 -0?65 -74396.2 -42629.2
is prcx (11.170) (O.IR2) (6(1374.3) (63R04.0)
l)nivcrs 11?S3 (1.2t11 469R[1.3 -16754.5
dcgrcc (0-2O2) (0?4i) (64993.5) ( RIRG0.2)
Lonl; O.442 0.36~t 313146.9 2G214R.5
horiz (0?S7) (11.'711) (R2R54.1 ) (R7747.7)
Paticnt (1.24K 11.3 I R 73 I 39.G I I(IRG2.9
(11.131 ) (0.142) (47416.3) (51716.9)
Ilomc (1.6111 1L6t5 375526.G 381783.R
Owncr (0.141) ((1.145) (55304.1) (i519R.2)
Y~2R,0(111 -(1.274 -0.244 -4320R.9 -2RR50.4
8c~43,0011 ((1.357) (0.3G(p (130210.9) (125215)
Y~ 43,OO(1 -0.070 -0?2R 79122.3 -126RR.5
Bc~RO,(1110 ((1.342) (11.35R) (119752.R) (12376G.9)
Y~- RII,000 11.1)03 11.392 3055R0.3 304602.8
(0.411) (0.513) (136691.1) ( 160098.8)
(inJcpcndcnt) ~hildren -(L9(16 -O.R77 -281417.G -2G8R69.2
ycslno (C'l lll.l)) (().271) (0.274) ( 107RRR.7) (104383.3)
(Y -2R,01111 11.7R9 0.753 25R051.9 235057.6
8c~43,0110)'CIIII,I) (IIAIS) (0.417) (156911.4) (150324)
Y~ d3,00(N('llll.l) ILR32 11.955 2G4347.2 351R26.6
(0.3R1) (0.4011) (137695.1) (1419GG.3)
Ri~h hh 11.632 192R73.6
sub-samplc (0.232) (7(1364.2)
q i,hti 454 375 454 375
Lug I.ik. -?62.57 ~25.13 -33(16.47 -2350.27
, tan arc crrors in parenl escs.
Sourcc: VS13 pancl.
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